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COMMENTS
EVIDENCE -ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF
OTHER OFFENSES
One of the most important, and certainly one of the most contro-
versial matters facing lawyers and courts alike in the field of criminal
law, is the matter of introduction by the state of evidence of offenses
other than that with which the defendant is charged. Since late in the
Fifteenth Century (the days of the courts of the Inquisition in Spain),
courts of England, and later the United States, have demonstrated an
abhorrence for any trial procedure which tends to overlook the rights
and privileges of the accused in an over-zealous attempt to give sanc-
tion to the laws that have been violated. It has long been felt that the
introduction of evidence of separate and distinct offenses, apart from
the one with which the defendant is charged, would be a practice which
would do violence to the safeguards that have been established to insure
to every defendant such a fair and impartial trial. It had long seemed
that our common law courts were content to reject evidence of other
crimes ipso facto but the first half of this century has witnessed a re-
versal of form, which to this writer seems to have reached its culmina-
tion in the case of the People v. Sullivan,' a California case decided in
1950. In that case, Sullivan, who was charged with forcible rape, was
confronted by a witnes other than the prosecutrix who was allowed to
testify to another alleged act of rape committed upon her by defendant
at a date after the commission of the crime with which he was charged.
Upon conviction Sullivan appealed, and the District Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction holding that testimony by a witness other than
prosecutrix, that subsequent to the commission of the alleged offense the
defendant committed the same offense upon that witness under similar
circumstances, was properly admitted to show a plan, scheme, system or
design into which fitted the commission of the offense for which the de-
fendant was on trial. The long standing general rule regarding admis-
sion of evidence of other crimes was, that upon the prosecution for one
offense, evidence of another distinct and separate offense is not admissi-
ble.2 The basis for this rule has been that admission of such evidence
would be prejudicial to the defendant because he would be forced to
meet charges upon which the indictment or information is silent, his
character would be put in issue by a showing of specific acts, and the
evidence would tend to prejudice the defendant in the minds of the jury
by causing them to believe that the defendant is guilty merely because
such similar acts evince a disposition to commit crimes like the one of
'People v. Sullivan, 215 P. (2d) 558 (Cal. 1950).
2 State v. Henger, 220 Wis. 410, 246 N.W. 922 (1936); Fischer v. State, 226
Wis. 290, 276 N.W. 640 (1938) ; 22 C.J.S. §682, 691; 1 Jones, Evidence 255-256(4th ed. 1938); 23 Marq. L. Rev-41 (1938).
1951]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
which he is accused. That such evidence is logically relevant, admits
of little doubt, but nevertheless, for the above reasons our common law
courts have always excluded it.3
Equally well recognized by now, however, is the exception to the
general rule which holds that evidence of other offenses is always ad-
missible to directly prove some material element of the crime charged.4
Evidence of other crimes is admissible where it tends to establish:
(1) motive ;5 (2) intent ;6 (3) absence of mistake or accident ;7 (4) the
identity of the accused,1 (5) a propensity toward sex crimes;9 (6) a
common scheme or plan involving the commission of similar crimes so
related to each other that proof of one or more of them tends to estab-
lish the accusation.10 These exceptions have in fact become so well
recognized and generally accepted as to have attained the status of a
rule themselves."
The broad scope of the general rule, and the many qualifications of
the exceptions to that rule would indicate wide latitude for conflicting
opinion, and such indeed has been the case. An apparently irreconcila-
ble conflict of opinion on the matter indicates that fine distinctions are
made in the fact situations, since all of our common law courts give at
3People v. Pollock, 31 Cal. App. (2d) 747, 89 P.(2d) 128 (1939); (Such evi-
dence would be unduly prejudicial to the accused.) ; State v. Gregory, 191 S.C.
212, 4 S.E.(2d) 1 (1939), "Proof that a defendant has been guilty of another
crime equally heinous prompts to a ready acceptance of and belief in the
prosecution's theory that he is guilty of the crime charged. Its effect is to
predispose the mind of the juror to believe the prisoner guilty, and thus
effectually to strip him of the presumption of innocence."; Colvin v. Com-
monwealth, 147 Va. 663, 137 S.E. 476 (1927), ("Such testimony is not within
the pleadings and would be an unfair surprise . . . to the accused.".
4People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901) ; Paulson v. State, 118
Wis. 89, 94 N.W. 771 (1903) ; Bradley v. State, 142 Wis. 137, 124 N.W. 1024(1910); Dietz v. State, 149 Wis. 462, 136 N.W. 166 (1912); 22 C.J.S. §688;
2 Wigmore, Evidence §304 (3d ed. 1940).
5 People v. Zabijak, 285 Mich. 164, 280 N.W. 144 (1938); State v. King, 342
Mo. 975, 119 S.W. (2d) 277 (1938).6 Paulson v. State, supra; Fenlon v. State, 195 Wis. 416, 217 N.W. 771 (1928);
State v. Smith, 195 Wis. 555, 218 N.W. 822 (1928); Bartz v. State, 229 Wis.
552, 282 N.W. 562 (1939).
7People v. Williams, 6 Cal.(2d) 500, 58 P.(2d) 917 (1936); State v. Baugh,
200 Iowa 1225, 206 N.W. 250 (1925).
8 People v. Filas, 396 Il. 51, 15 N.E. (2d) 496 (1938); State v. Smook, 213
N.C. 79, 195 S.E. 72 (1938); State v. Jackson, 219 Wis. 13, 261 N.W. 732
(1935) ; Herde v. State, 236 Wis. 408, 295 N.W. 684 (1941) ; Bridges v. State,
247 Wis. 350, 19 N.W. (2d) 529 (1945).
9 Commonwealth v. Piccerillo, 256 Mass. 487, 152 N.E. 746 (1926) ; Gundlach v.
State, 184 Wis. 65, 198 N.W. 742 (1924).
10 People v. Molineux, supra, Note 3, "To bring a case within this exception
to the general rule... there must be evidence of system between the offense
on trial and the one sought to be introduced. They must be connected as
parts of a general and composite plan or scheme or they must be so re-
lated to each other as to show a common motive or intent running through
both." State v. Vincent, 202 Wis. 47, 231 N.W. 263 (1930).
"1 State v. Lord, 42 N.M. 638, 84 P.(2d) 80 (1938); State v. Vincent, supra,
Note 9; State v. Jackson, supra, Note 7.
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least lip service to the same general rule, with the same exceptions, and
yet in almost identical fact situations arrive at contrary decisions.'2
As the reader is no doubt well aware, the application of rules of
evidence is greatly influenced by the nature of the crime with which the
defendant is charged. Indeed, it would be beyond the designed scope
of this type of comment to even attempt to survey the entire field of
criminal offenses and examine the peculiarities of each, so of necessity
this article will be confined to one type of offense only. The most wide-
spread and marked deviation from the old rule has been apparent in
the case of sex offenses and so the election was made to confine this ar-
ticle to that general field. Since this discussion concerns itself with sex
crimes exclusively, it would be well to note at this point that most juris-
dictions give considerably more weight to the exceptions to the general
rule in the case of sex offenses, 13 and accordingly, many of the follow-
ing holdings will be unique, and germane to that type of crime only.
The fact situations involving evidence of other sex offenses of the
defendant fall broadly into four divisions: (1) a similar offense with
the same person, prior to the commission of the crime for which the
defendant is being tried; (2) with the same person, at a subsequent
time; (3) same offense with a person other than the prosecutrix, at a
prior time; (4) other person at a subsequent time.
Although regrettable for reasons of continuity, it perhaps will be
expedient at this point to insert a brief note on the matter of presump-
tions arising from admitted evidence, before examining the attitude of
our courts toward evidence of crimes in the four divisions given above.
Obviously, any extensive examination of the rules governing presump-
tions is impossible, and not only would be be out of place, but unneces-
sary here. This discussion is concerned only with the running of pre-
sumptions, and for this purpose it will be sufficient merely to notice the
general rule that presumptions run forward, but not backward. Al-
though not expressly stated in the following decisions, unquestionably
a make-weight argument for admission of evidence of prior crimes is
the fact that generally a presumption will run forward, and apply to
subsequent acts, while accordingly, sincepresumptions do not run back-
wards, evidence of a subsequent offense will raise no presumption of
value in the prosecution of a prior offense, and consequently weigh
against the admission of evidence of subsequent crimes. The courts
have been quite uniform in their acceptance of evidence in the first di-
vision, when it has been properly qualified to show motive, intent, plan
or the like.14 The majority of our courts have quite consistently refused,
12 State v. Lord, supra, Note 10.
"3 People v. Schwartz, 79 Cal. App. 160, 248 P. 1043 (1926); People v. Place,
226 Mich. 212, 197 N.W. 513 (1924); State v. Oberg, 187 Wash. 429, 60
P.(2d) -66 (1936); Wharton, Criminal Evidence 170 §42 (11th ed.).
'1422 C.J.S. §691; 2 Wigrnore, Evidence §357 (3d ed. 1940).
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evidence in the second division, 15 but there seems to be a growing tend-
ency, supported by good authority, to admit such evidence.16 Division
three is accepted but rarely, and then usually only in cases where both
crimes happened at the same time or place, or in the case of crimes
with infants where the evidence is admitted to show a mental twist or
quirk.' The courts admitting evidence to show such mental twist pro-
ceed on the premise that while a forced sexual act with an adult female
is a crime, it is not so unnatural as to show a defective mentality, while
unnatural acts, or sex crimes against children evince a depravity of
mind which is relevant to the issue and may be shown by other offenses
of like nature. Until quite recently, evidence in the fourth class was
uniformly held inadmissible for any purpose, but some recent decisions
show that an attempt is being made to open the door to this type of
evidence. There have been admissions to indicate intent,", and plan or
scheme,'9 and while none are directly in point, they indicated the path
which, correctly or not, one state at least, California, has decided to
follow. Although several states have provisions for the admission of
evidence which, on their face, would admit evidence in this last class, 2°
these cases are the clearest admissions of such evidence that seem to
have been made, and California, with the Sullivan case and the case of
People v. Ross," seems to have taken the most liberal stand on this
matter.
There is a fifth division, really a combination of the first and second,
which, although not a primary classification, is of enough importance
to necessitate mention here. That class includes offenses with the same
person both before and after the offense for which defendant is on trial.
This class of evidence is logically admissible, if the prior acts are first
established. Once the prior acts have been shown, the offense with
which defendant is charged is shown, and then the matter of further
15 22 C.J.S. §691.16 People v. Furhman, 130 Cal. App. 267, 19 P. (2d) 821 (1933); 2 Wigmore,
Evidence §316 (3d ed. 1940).
17 State v. Martinez, 65 Ariz. 389, 198 P. (2d) 115 (1948) ; People v. Cassandras,83 Cal. App. (2d) 272, 188 P.(2d) 546 (1948); State v. Clough, 33 Del. 140,
132 A. 219 (1925) ; Bridges v. State, supra, Note 7.18 McKenzie v. State, 250 Ala. 178, 33 So. (2d) 488 (1948); Andrews v. State,
196 Ga. 84, 26 S.E.(2d) 263 (1943).19Talley v. State, 36 So. (2d) 201 (Fla. 1948) ; Dorsey v. State, 49 S.E. (2d) 886
(Ga. 1948).20 Mich. 3 Comp. Laws 1929, sec. 17320, "In any criminal case where the de-
fendant's motive, intent, the absence of, mistake or accident on his part, or
the defendanes scheme, plan or system in doing an act, is material, any like
acts or other acts of the defendant which may tend to show his motive, intent,
the absence of, mistake or accident on his part, or the defendant's scheme,plan or system in doing the act in question, may be proved, whether they are
contemporaneous with or prior or subsequent thereto; notwithstanding that
such proof may show or tend to show the commission of another or prior
or subsequent crime by the defendant."
21221 P.(2d) 280 (Cal. 1950).
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subsequent offenses is relevant as showing a continuing series of of-
fenses, or one continuing crime as the case may be. The evidence, pro-
ceeding from prior to subsequent acts, through and including the crime
charged, shows a continuing course of action, and in such case, all in-
cluded acts will raise a presumption of guilt in regard to the offense
charged.
To follow the logic of the California Court in admitting this evi-
dence in the Sullivan case, it is necessary to point out that the defend-
ant was charged with forcible rape, and the other offense testified to
was also an act of forcible rape, in which the circumstances and the
method of attack were almost identical with those of the first offense.
The trial court qualified the admission thus: "This evidence was ad-
mitted in this case to show that there existed in the mind of the de-
fendant a plan, scheme, system or design into which fitted the com-
mission of the offense for which he is now on trial." The reason for
the admission is relevant because the purpose or reason for the admis-
sion of evidence of another offense in each instance poses another test
which the evidence must meet to qualify for admission for that pur-
pose.22 When the very doing of the act with which the defendant is
charged is still to be proved, one of the evidential facts receivable is
the person's plan or design to do it. However, to show evidence of other
crimes to prove plan or design, there has to be more than merely the
doing of similar acts. Wigmore points out that there must be shown,
".... such a concurrence of common features that the various acts are
naturally to be explained as caused by a general plan of which they are
the individual manifestations." 23 There is a very good discussion of the
theory behind the rules on the admission of evidence of other crimes in
the dissenting opinion of Justice Livingston in McKenzie v. State.24
It has been said that the general rule that a person who is on trial
charged with a particular crime may not be shown to be guilty thereof
by evidence showing that he has committed other crimes, is one of the
distinguishing features of our common law jurisprudence, 25 and the
writer feels that the decision of the California Court represents a de-
cisive move towards the elimination of that distinction. It is inevitable
that regardless of how many good and logical reasons may be presented
for the unrestricted admission of relevant evidence, there eventually
will be a point where the probable benefit to the prosecution will be so
insignificant in the face of the dangers to the defendant's right of fair
and impartial trial, that the preservation of our system of jurisprudence
will demand that a final line be drawn and no further extension be
22 2 Wigmore, Evidence §300 (3d ed. 1940).2 3 2Wigmore, Evidence §304 (3d ed. 1940).
24 McKenzie v. State, supra, Note 16.
25 People v. Grutz, 212 N.Y. 72, 105 N.E. 843 (1914).
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made. It would seem that the California Court at least has gone beyond
this line in the Sullivan case and indicated an inclination which may re-
sult in the abandonment of one of our fundamental rules of evidence.
It is to be sincerely hoped that other jursidictions do not also fall into
the error of confusing the means with the end, and protecting the for-
mer to the extent of harming the latter. It would be supremely ironic
if we were to destroy and abandon our personal security in an endeavor
to enforce laws designed to protect that same security.
JAMES J. KOENEN
